American foreign policy has seemed to reach a dead end. It no longer serves either the needs of the United States nor those of the world. One reason for reaching this dead end is the unwillingness or inability of persons at the top levels of our government to understand the ways in which the countries with which we deal view or would prefer to view the world. Analysts and politicians in the United States have recently become fixated on Iran and the challenge that it represents. However, the tendency has been to interpret the “Iranian threat” narrowly as a part of the posited war of the West and Islam. For some Arab commentators, it is seen primarily as a rise in the power and influence of Shi’ism, the so-called Shiite crescent.
It would help if both groups of analysts remembered that for millennia Iranians were dominant in a broad region spreading from Anatolia to Uzbekistan, to India, then back along the Persian Gulf to Iraq and Syria. To historically conscious Iranians, Iraq, for example, as been more often an integral part of their country than a foreign state, while much of Afghanistan and what we call Central Asia has long been a center of Iranian culture, centering on the present-day Uzbek cities of Samarqand and Bokhara. Remember that Iran’s Achaemenid Empire was the successor state to the former Empires of Assyria and Babylonia. The identification of Iran with Mesopotamia was further sealed by the Parthian and Sassanian Empires that strove to emulate the Achaemenid. They placed their capital at Ctesiphon, twenty miles from present-day Baghdad. -- Those who consider this recitation “merely” ancient history should be reminded of the territorial memories of modern Jews in Palestine or the Serbian special relationship with Kosovo (its Albanian province.) because of a defeat there in the 14th century.
After the Arab conquest, dominant cultural influences in Mesopotamia were Persian as much as Arabic during the Abbasid period, 750-1258. An Iranian confederacy ruled directly in Baghdad from 934-1055. After the Mongol cataclysm, the Safavids of Iranian background conquered Iran, as well as large portions of Iraq, imposing Shi’a doctrine on the entire area. The Safavids and their successors ruled from 1500 to nearly 1800. During this period they often controlled Baghdad. Iran continued to rule or have political influence in parts of modern day Iraq up until the 1920s: it was even suggested to the British that they appoint a Persian prince as monarch in Iraq in the 1920s. This summer, the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq announced that Iran is committed to working with Iraqi national and provincials governments on a restoration of the great palace at Ctesiphon.
American policy makers should remember that a lasting solution in Iraq must take into account Iranian interests, interests that go beyond their mutual Shi’ism and the concerns of the day.
This historical Iran is steadily expanding its influence in neighboring countries.
In Afghanistan, Iran has built a new highway in the west. They have strung a high-voltage power line next to it. Underneath, they have laid a fiber-optic cable that provides telephone and Internet access to the region. In Kabul, they are building a medical center and a water-testing laboratory. Iran has a training program for librarians, teachers, and diplomats. At the university, Iran has set up an Iranian corner with information on Iranian culture, ancient and modern. It is said to be more popular than an equivalent American corner because it offers superior computer access. Plans are afoot for another road project and a rail link connecting Kabul to the Iranian rail system. The Iranians are also improving a road linking the country with a Persian port on the Indian ocean, thereby reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on outlets through Pakistan.
Although Iran and the United States cooperated in the defeat of the Taliban and the establishment of the Karzai government in Kabul, after the axis of evil speech and the ouster of Ismail Khan from the governorship in Herat, Iran’s propaganda in the area has taken on a definitely anti-American character.
’s help to Lebanon through the medium of Hezbollah has been many-sided. Less well-known is the assistance to Syria. Here Iran has assisted in the establishment of an automobile factory. The parts will be from Iran and the car will have an Iranian name. Soon, in partnership with Iran, Syria will build another automobile factory, a cement plant, and add 1200 new buses to its transportation services.
Although most Syrians are Sunnis, the country is ruled by a small Alawite minority that the Sunni Muslim world consider heretics. The Iranians have entered into this religious mix with the establishment of new centers for Shi’a education. Its religious-political leader have also declared the Alawites to be Muslims in good standing (this is certainly a gift that Washington cannot provide).
West of the Caspian Iran borders two former Soviet Republics recently converted into independent states: Armenia and Azerbaijan, states with a bitter territorial dispute. One would think that Iran would side with Azerbaijan. Its area was for many years a province of Iran. Its people are largely Azerbaijanis with a language and culture close to that of the larger Azerbaijan section of Iran. Most of the independent Azeris belong to the same branch of Shi’ism as the Iranians (being converted by the Safavids at the same time). On the other hand, generations of Soviet control have changed the country. Its leaders are considered closer to the Americans, and Iran has lingering fears that the existence of an Azeri state on its borders may fuel separatist ambitions on the Iranian side of the line.
The counter-intuitive result is that the Iranians have developed very close relations with the Christian Armenian state, especially after Ahmadinejad’s election. (The remarkable favoring of a Christian over a Shi'ite state suggests the extent to which traditional national interests trump religious identity even for “the Mullahs”.) Among other projects, Iran is helping Armenia build a new highway and tunnel, a new power plant, and a new gas pipeline connecting the countries. This may be tied in with a planned new pipeline bringing gas from Turkmenistan.
Iran has been working for several years on developing a closer relationship with Tajikistan in Central Asia. There is no common border, but the countries have a close historical relation. The Tajiks speak a language almost indistinguishable from Modern Persian, although the introduction of large numbers of Russian loan words and the use of the Russian alphabet has set them apart. Here, Iran is investing in a new power plant, is helping the reconstruction of the country’s power network, and helping to construct a new tunnel. The countries are laying plans for the construction of a road connecting the Tajikistan with Iran through Afghanistan, thereby ultimately opening up improved access of the country to the Indian Ocean. There is also talk of a free trade zone that would include Afghanistan and Turkey. Tajikistan and Iran have also agreed to help Pakistan with its looming energy crisis by making available excess power and other means.
There is much talk in the Western media about the anti-democratic or non-democratic nature of the Iranian government. It is surely not the kind of liberal democracy that many in the West think they would like to see in Iran, but it is neither a closed society nor a dictatorship. It is important to understand the system before we attempt to support its opponents or consider a dialogue with the country’s leaders. Let us take a brief look.
Iran’s Constitution provides for one of the most complex systems of government that I am acquainted with. It is a mixture of elected and unelected officials with both formal and informal aspects.
At the top is the Head of State (currently Khamenei). Elected by the Assembly of Experts, he may be dismissed at any time by that body. Aside from this, he has broad and nearly unlimited powers. He is Supreme Commander of the military, appoints the head of the judicial branch, declares war and peace, and can call for a mobilization. He also appoints the Guardian Council, a branch in some ways equivalent to a Senate.
The Assembly of Experts consists of 86 mujtahids or religious scholars popularly elected for eight-year terms. They “oversee” the Head of State and may dismiss him at any time. Since they are popularly elected, the head of state is himself indirectly elected and overseen by elected persons.
The Guardian Council oversees and vets all candidates to national office, or to the Assembly of Experts. Six members are clerics appointed by the Head of State and six are lawyers proposed by the head of the judiciary and approved by parliament. The Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, and the Head of State must all be generally accepted religious leaders (or “experts in religious law”, in a law-centered religious system). It must approve all bills passed by parliament before they become law.
Parliament is elected on the national level from single and multi-member districts. It makes the laws or at least passes on them.
The Expediency Discernment Council is meant to mediate disputes between Parliament and the Guardian Council when they cannot agree on legislation. Its 34 members are directly appointed by the Head of State.
The President (currently Ahmadinejad) is directly elected, although again candidates must be vetted. His powers are quite limited. In theory, he is head of government, appoints ambassadors and proposes cabinet officers to the parliament. He appoints governors, but he no longer appoints mayors. He must approve all legislation and is automatically head of the National Security Council.
Below the national level, local and village councils are elective.
While formally, it would seem the system is completely under the thumb of the Shiite hierarchy, for several reasons this is not as dictatorial as might be thought. First, there is no Shiite hierarchy comparable to that of the Mormon or Catholic churches. There are a large number of religious figures with sufficient standing in the religious world to be considered for government positions. Each has his own lay and clerical following. Some of these mujtahids are highly regarded throughout the Shi’a world, such as Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf. (Incidentally, Sistani who has long disapproved of the Iranian system has his own following in Iran, people who regularly teach and propagandize in his favor among clerical students) The mujtahids range from highly conservative to relatively liberal. Sometimes they reach consensus, but not always. Secondly, although many people, clerics or not, are not allowed to run for office because of the vetting process, in recent elections, the accepted candidates standing for parliament, local positions, or the Assembly of Experts have represented many different constituencies, on both right and left.
I would call the system: Limited Authoritarianism
A recent article in the Washington Quarterly is entitled “Understanding Iran’s New Authoritarianism”. It purports to show how Iran is quickly evolving from a specialized theocratic state into a standard authoritarian regime of the kind that has long characterized the region. The author tells us that “a new group of younger ideologues is taking over the conservative establishment”.
In fact, this is not what is happening. It is not happening for a variety of reasons. First, the governmental system is a complex mixture of electorate-dependent powers and clerical elite-dependent powers. Unlike the situation in many democracies, it is not enough to get elected and develop a cult of personality. In addition, Iran has lively public and media input into public affairs. And in spite of the nondemocratic vetting, those competing for elective office have a much more equitable chance of success than in authoritarian states such as Egypt. Campaigning is much freer and more open than in any Arab states outside Lebanon (in its better days).
By mid-January it had become apparent that Ahmadinejad’s belligerent language and world tours had produced a backlash among the Iranian people. The Head of State has felt it necessary to openly censor the President. Two hard line newspapers, one owned by the Head of State, called on the president to stay out of all matters nuclear. Government officials are saying that the sanctions do have a potential to seriously hurt the economy. Fifty legislators wrote a letter calling on the president to appear before parliament to defend his nuclear policies. 150 legislators signed another letter criticizing the president for his economic policies and his failure to submit a budget on time. The stock market has been in a steady decline for a month. A group of businessmen has met with the National Security Council to ask for a moderation in nuclear policies to help stem the slide.
It should be noted that several of those defeated in the 2005 presidential election now hold high positions in government. Rafsanjani, the former President and loser in the 2005 Presidential election is now the head of the Assembly of Experts. He is thought to be positioning himself to take over as Head of State after Khamenei's retirement. One might call the system elite government by consensus modified by electoral inputs.
American advocates of instant, universal democracy often refer to the Iranian system as a fraudulent democracy. Yet it is well to reflect that the dangers from ostensible democracies that we face in the world come from persons, often populists, who are able to use democratic institutions to achieve electoral and then personal supremacy. These were the roads to power of Mussolini and Hitler. We have often faced such dangers in Latin America, and today we fear the regimes taking shape in Venezuela, Bolivia, and possibly once again in Nicaragua. The problem in such democracies is that there are not sufficient institutional controls to head off mobocracy. We might consider the advantages for the world of a more controlled democracy in which a loose cannon such as Ahmadinejad may be more easily controlled internally, even if the democracy is in other ways defective.
Let us think for a moment more generally about the American campaign for Universal Democracy
The threat of a Kabul court a few months ago to execute a man for converting from Islam to Christianity raised in an especially clear form the contradiction between “democracy” as we understand it and “democracy” as it may reasonably be understood by others.
Democracy was understood by ancient Greek scholars and the Founding Fathers to be a dangerous form of government. They saw it as mob rule, and they knew that a mob could easily be swayed one way or another by emotions, often stirred up by demagogues. Many of these Fathers saw the French Revolution as a confirmation of their opinions, which most of the them saw as a lesson to be avoided.
In this climate of opinion, they drew up a plan for a nation based on a Constitution that circumscribed the political rights of ordinary people in several ways. First, political power was to be exercised through elected representatives rather than directly. In addition, the senate and the president were to be indirectly elected. Today, the electoral system allows for a clearer expression of the popular will than it did originally, but our constitutional system still limits the ability of the people to directly affect how the country is run, especially in the short term. Most important, the Constitution established a system of rights guaranteed by courts presided over by judges that at least at the top were not elected and served for life. The rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were effectively “set in stone”. The Constitution could be changed, but changing it was a lengthy process. The amendments that were accepted over the course of the next 200 years expanded guarantees of freedom and equality, but did not fundamentally change the structure the Founders had created.
When American representatives proclaim in international forums that they support the universality of democracy, they appear to be asking all peoples without democracy to change their systems of governance in three rather different directions. First, they are seen to be asking other countries to accept a political system similar to ours. Or they are understood to be asking other peoples to establish political systems in which “free and fair” elections are the essential ingredient. Or, they are asking other peoples to institute political systems that guarantee international human rights, particularly those characterized as civil liberties. It is seldom pointed out to other publics or understood by American communicators that these three aspects of democracy can contradict one another.
In the Islamic world, America’s promotion of democracy becomes especially problematic. Many Islamic countries are quite prepared to establish electoral systems for choosing the people who will lead them. But they understand that those elected should be limited in their decision power, much as they are in our own Constitution, by courts established on the basis of operative legal traditions. In their case, the best known legal tradition is Islamic, and the highest courts may be Shari’ah courts, courts based on principles and ideas that are quite different from those prescribed by modern definitions of human rights. Islamic leaders might well note that American democracy is even today not always on the side of what are now considered international human rights, particularly in areas such as polygamy and capital punishment. In America, “the people” are free to enact legislation violating international standards. This legislation remains the law of the land as long as it is not countermanded by our courts. On the other hand, our non-elected judges are also free to decide against international standards on the basis of what they understand to be American legal tradition.
So in bringing “democracy” to Islamic countries, we are faced with the fact that an Islamic people may through electoral processes decide on laws and procedures that go very much against our modern concept of democracy, such as prescribing the stoning of adulterers. We also must face the fact that accepting the American idea of an independent judiciary would seem to lay the basis for enshrining in law and practice Shari’ah provisions that are simply not “acceptable” to the modern West. It is very difficult to say that in instituting democracy in this way, they are not adopting at least one of the proffered definitions of democracy.
This suggests that those who promote democracy should step back and rethink what they are about.
First, they should be clearer in our own minds about what changes should have highest priority in moving the world toward greater freedom. Priority must be given to the creation of a world of responsible states that progressively exhibit increasing respect for international human rights while preserving their capability to secure the peace internally and within their regions. With this change of focus, they should be less enthusiastic in promoting “democracy” without qualification in Islamic countries. America’s democratic role should be to increase respect for human rights in such countries, building the bases for the emergence of a true western-style liberal democracy sometime in the future.
Second, in campaigning for an expansion of democracy, the goal should not be defined primarily in terms of elections. “Democracy” must be understood as encompassing a much broader range of modern institutions and rights. In America's democracy campaign, it will also be helpful to deemphasize American models, asking other peoples to consider a wider range of models, some of which are actually more decisively in the modern liberal tradition than we happen to be. It is particularly important that we not identify capitalism with democracy. While capitalism with a variety of qualifications has characterized our own democratic success, other countries have succeeded as democracies with governments and peoples much more dedicated to egalitarianism and a larger degree of governmental intervention in the economy than has characterized the United States.
With this approach, Americans will be less likely to seem brazenly inconsistent in their advocacy of democracy, as they were characterized after Washington effectively rejected the coming to power of Hamas in Palestine through more or less free and fair elections.
Repeated suggestions that the United States should negotiate with the Iran seem to come to naught. President Bush has somehow gotten it into his head that Iran is an “evil state” on a par with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq before our invasion. He wonders how such an evil government can be negotiated with. Sometimes he insists that if Iran changes, or if Iran renounces its present policies, then perhaps we could have something to talk about.
The Iraq Study Group Report (Baker and Hamilton) stressed the desirability of negotiating with the Iranians, as well as other Iraqi neighbors. The idea has not gained much traction at a time when the United States and Iran are locked in a serious war of words over (1) Iranian support of terrorism, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and (2) the willingness of the Iranians to defy the American demand that they cease their nuclear energy program on the basis that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon. Some groups in Washington talk of the need to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities sooner rather than later. Many commentators have concluded we would be attacking Iran now if it were not for the Iraq fiasco. Seymour Hersh tells us that the United States is secretly supporting anti-Tehran forces in Iranian Kurdistan in the west and Baluchistan in the southeast. This is in addition to supporting the planning and propaganda of mainline anti-regime elements based in the West. All this is against the background of a relationship that includes a continuing absence of diplomatic relations because of an incident dating back to 1980.
I suggest that we need to take a deep breath, reconsider out relations, and then set out to fundamentally restructure the American relationship with Iran.
First, we need to think again about refusing to talk to Iran because of its perhaps dangerous development of nuclear capability. We should recall that official American policy, reinforced recently by a Senate vote, is to support the development of nuclear energy in India, a country that openly broke the ban on nuclear proliferation. Because of the known relationship of Pakistan and India, the fact that Pakistan has also developed a nuclear weapon has also been accepted without letting this damage our relationship with that country. Turkey on the west is part of NATO, an alliance that depends on nuclear weapons for deterrence. It is an open secret that Israel, a country that has often announced the need to “do something” about Iran has nuclear weapons. (Incidentally, it is odd that concern for Pakistan’s already existing nuclear capability remains muted, in spite of the fact that Musharref might be unseated by an Islamist coup at any time and Pakistan has a record of sharing nuclear technology with other states.)
I do not know if the Iranians will or will not develop a nuclear weapon if they continue their nuclear program. But I do know that it is unlikely that Iran, whether ruled by mullahs or democrats, will feel that the United States has justice on its side in the nuclear dispute. This being the case, it is unlikely that threats or sanctions will in the long run arrest the development Iran wishes; indeed, it may even give added ammunition to those Iranians who want nuclear weapons so that the country might more easily stand up to Americans.
Second, we need to consider our refusal to talk because Iranians have supported armed factions in Lebanon and Iraq. I would point out that we should remember that the continuing support by Saudis of what have become Jihadist schools in many countries does not inhibit working with them on issues of common interest. We have tacitly accepted the fact that our good ally Pakistan blatantly allows the training and arming of Taliban recruits on its soil. Yet it is out ally, and we must work with its government. Would that we took the same attitude toward Iran.
We should recall that after 9/11 the Iran has been much less involved in terrorism directed against the United States and Europe than its neighbors. In fact, Iran assisted the American effort to defeat the Taliban in Iraq. Since Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies are also extremist in their anti-Shi’a diatribes, Iran is in many ways a natural ally of the United States in this part of the anti-terrorist “war”. We should also recall that Iranians have been largely absent from the list of terrorists that have been arrested for terrorist activities in Europe and the United States. I note there have been North Africans, Saudis, Egyptians, citizens of Gulf states, and, also and especially, Pakistanis among the accused. The terrorists frequently seem to train in Pakistan. We should note that the United States and Pakistan have been close allies during the Cold War and the War Against Terrorism, as odd as this may seem.
Iran has a greater stake than that of any other country outside the American-led Coalition in the outcome of the chaos in Iraq. Its interests are three-fold. First is its historic record as a dominant power in the area now occupied by Iraq. Second is its domination by Shi’as, the national religion of Iran and the dominant religion in more than half of Iraq. The relation of the societies through the Shi’a bond goes back to the conversion of half of Iraq to Shi’ism by the Iranians in the 15th and 16th centuries. The overwhelming majority of foreigners who visit the holy cities of Iraq are Iranians. We remember that Ayatollah Khomeini plotted his victorious return to Iran from his exile in Iraq. Third, is the natural desire of Iranians to make sure that a powerful Iraqi state dominated by Sunnis never again threatens Iran as it did in the 1980s. In retrospect, the United States was simply wrong to support Saddam Hussein in his war with the Iranians. We backed the wrong horse and we have had to pay for it.
Two recent events have affected the possibility and usefulness of negotiations. First, nationwide local elections including an election of the “experts” who choose the actual head of state has resulted in a setback for Ahmadinejad in Iran. The moderates and reformists have made critical gains. This would seem to offer an opening to any power that really wanted to engage the Iranians. Moreover, the exercise itself has once again shown that Iran is in no way in the league with North Korea and Saddam’s Iraq. It is a much more modernized and vibrant state, with possibilities for real choice and discussion, in spite of the continuation of controls over the media and the jailing of opposition figures.
Second, and less promising, the United States and Great Britain have announced that they are increasing the size of their fleets in the Persian Gulf. This reversion to “gunboat diplomacy” will hardly make Iran’s leaders anxious to negotiate about anything. Neither is it likely to be well received by the Iranian opposition that remains hotly nationalist in spite of everything.
As Baker, in discussing his Report, has pointed out: “If you have problems in a relationship, you sit down and discuss them. And you cannot have such a discussion if you insist that your partner yield on major points before the discussion begins.” One can only hope that this administration reconsider the Report’s recommendations for talks, and not just talks to avert catastrophe in Iraq. Iran and the United States share many more interests than that.
In conclusion, the United States should develop diplomatic relations with Iran as soon as possible. We should then discuss our common interests, including the concessions that each side feels it can make. Let us mention a few possibilities for discussion: there are many more. We should accept Iran having a major interest in Iraq. In return for curbing the violence of some of the Iraqi actors often said to be aligned with Iran, such as the Mahdi Army, we should accept their role in training and equipping security forces in Iraq, especially in Shi’a areas. We should encourage Iran to accept the existence of a semi-independent Kurdistan, on the understanding that the United States will not support new revolutionary activity among the Iranian Kurds.